The 2009 crash of Turkish Airlines flight 1951 as it attempted to land at Amsterdam's Schipol Airport eerily resembled the two Boeing 737 Max aircraft crashes from 2019 where 346 people died.
A decade splits the Amsterdam 2009 incident from the 2019 ones in Ethiopia and Indonesia. However, the same issue arose in all three Boeing 737 Max crashes: the failure of a single sensor that led to computer errors.
The New York Times was the first to publish these findings.
Pilots were not warned by Boeing of the issues
Aviation safety expert, Sidney Dekker, commissioned by the Dutch Security Board, said that the first Boeing 737 crash in 2009 "represents such a sentinel event that was never taken seriously." Dekker points the finger squarely at Boeing for these events, who themselves pointed the finger at the pilots of the crashed planes.
An expert study that was never made public found that Boeing bore significant responsibility for a deadly 737 crash in 2009. Our review of the evidence reveals striking parallels with recent 737 Max crashes. https://t.co/ajEkhSsDPJ— The New York Times (@nytimes) January 20, 2020
Boeing tried to deflect the attention from their own "design shortcomings," and their responsibilities from the deadly crash were buried away.
The 2009 Turkish Airlines flight — in a Boeing aircraft which was the predecessor to the Boeing 737 Max aircraft — crashed upon trying to land in Amsterdam, killing nine out of the 128 passengers on board. The crash could have been worse had the third pilot not been an ex-Turkish Air Force officer, used to flying under pressure and difficult conditions.
Dekker's extensive study on the matter was never made public.
"In the 2009 and Max accidents, for example, the failure of a single sensor caused systems to misfire, with catastrophic results, and Boeing had not provided pilots with information that could have helped them react to the malfunction." https://t.co/Gjq7Zj1Lsh— SchipholWatch (@SchipholWatch) January 20, 2020
Other Dutch investigators placed the blame on the pilots operating the plane for failing to react properly when actually it was an automated system malfunction along with faulty safety assessments and design options by Boeing that meant that the plane crashed.
It turns out that Boeing did not provide pilots operating the aircraft with enough information to react to the malfunction, should it occur, according to Dekker's study.
The Dutch Safety Board decided not to share Dekker's investigation after Boeing officials and federal safety officers approached them.
Unfortunately, these 2009 findings are all too similar to the two Boeing 737 Max crashes from 2019.
Shawn Pruchniki, a professor of Ohio State University who has experience in investigating incidents told the Times "It’s really easy to blame it on the dead pilots and say it has nothing to do with our improperly designed system. It just gets frustrating because we keep having the same types of accidents."